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THE PROSPECT OF ANTIMONOPOLY 
LEGISLATION IN CHINA 
WANG XIAOYE 
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, privatization, a reduction in 
administrative intervention, and antimonopoly measures have become the 
general trend of economic policies around the world. As a result, various 
countries have sped up the creation and implementation of their own 
antimonopoly legislation rapidly. Currently, antimonopoly laws exist not 
only in economically developed countries but also in many developing 
countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The countries that have 
made the most progress in this area are those within the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe. Most of these countries adopted antimonopoly 
laws in the early 1990s when they made the transition from a planned 
economy to a market economy. China adopted the Law of the People’s 
Republic of China Against Unfair Competition in September 1993,1 but 
has yet to promulgate a special antimonopoly law. However, with the 
increasing marketization of the Chinese economy, and with China’s 
admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) on December 11, 
2001, the call for the speedy adoption and promulgation of an 
antimonopoly law is now much louder. The promulgation of an 
antimonopoly law undoubtedly will promote economic and political 
reform in China. 
I. CHINA’S SOCIALIST MARKET ECONOMY NEEDS A SYSTEM TO 
PROTECT COMPETITION 
The Chinese Constitution, revised in 1993, stipulates that “[t]he State 
implements a system of socialist market economy.”2 China ultimately will 
abandon its planned economy (whereby there is administrative 
management of the national economy) and replace it with a market 
economy (whereby a market mechanism regulates the allocation of 
resources and economic development). Laws adapted to the market 
  Professor of law, Institute of Law, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; J.D., Hamburg 
University. 
 1. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Buzhengdang Jingzhengfa [Law of the People’s Republic 
of China Against Unfair Competition] (1993), available at http://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/China/ 
Competition/cncom2.html [hereinafter Law Against Unfair Competition]. 
 2. XIANFA [CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] art. 15 (1999). 
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economy must regulate, restrain, and safeguard the socialist market 
economy. Among these laws, the most important are those that protect fair 
and free competition. 
A. Conditions for Competition in the Current Chinese Economy 
Currently, China is still in a period of transition from a planned 
economy to a market economy. The market has yet to fully develop and 
still lacks an environment that encourages open and fair competition. 
However, a trend towards the marketization of the economy already is 
very clear. This trend has created certain conditions for competition 
among enterprises. 
1. Disruption of the State Monopolized Price System 
Since the reform and “opening-up” policies began in the late 1970s, the 
government has decentralized the pricing of most commodities and 
services. According to the Pricing Law of the People’s Republic of China, 
the Chinese government should set the prices of only those commodities 
for which competition would be inappropriate, including those that are of 
importance to the national economy and the national livelihood, rare 
resources and resources in shortage, naturally monopolized commodities, 
and commodities relating to public welfare.3 Since August 1, 2001, the 
government has liberalized the prices of ten commodities and services, 
subjecting them to the will of the market.4 After this round of 
liberalization, the market regulates the “prices of more than 90% of retail, 
agricultural, and capital goods.”5 With the relaxation of its control over the 
prices of most products, the Chinese government drastically decreased the 
scope and number of mandatory production plans. As a result, enterprises 
gradually grew conscious of competition and risk taking, and subsequently 
abandoned the old idea of “everybody eating from the same big pot.” 
 3. Pricing Law of the People’s Republic of China art. 18 (1997) [hereinafter Pricing Law].  
 4. These products include sugar, agricultural film material, natural rubber, and coal for power 
generation. Now only thirteen products or services, including government-reserved grains, certain 
fertilizers, important medicines, natural gas, water, electricity, and postal and telecommunication 
services remain under governmental pricing control. See Fu Jing, State Liberalizes Prices on 10 Items, 
ZHONGGUO RIBAO [CHINA DAILY], July 12, 2001, available at 2001 WL 7483132. 
 5. Id. 
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2. The Presence of a Plural Enterprise Ownership Structure 
The modern ownership structure of Chinese enterprises evolved from 
the domination of the public ownership system (including ownership by 
the people and collectives) to the coexistence of state, collective, private, 
and various other forms of ownership. Consequently, the percentage of 
state-owned enterprises in the national economy has decreased gradually. 
According to statistics, the state-owned portion of the national economy 
decreased to 28.8% in 1998 whereas the collectively owned portion 
increased to 44.4%. The non-public portion increased from 13.4% in 1993 
to 30.8% in 1998.6 The percentage of the total sales volume of social 
consumer products for state-owned commercial enterprises and state-
owned holding companies decreased from 67% in 1978 to 21% in 1998.7 
The proportion of non-public businesses will continue to increase with the 
deepening of economic reform and China’s accession to the WTO. This is 
especially true considering the third revision of the Chinese Constitution 
in 1999, which stipulated that the individual economy, private economy, 
and other non-public sectors of the economy are important components of 
the social market economy,8 as well as that “[t]he state protects the lawful 
rights and interests of the individual economy.”9  
In light of the goal of establishing a socialist market economy, the 
gradual decrease in the percentage of state-owned businesses benefits 
society. Experience shows that too large a percentage of state-owned 
businesses in the national economy hinders the development of the 
competitive economy as a whole and ultimately will result in economic 
rigidity and recession. On the other hand, the coexistence and parallel 
development of various sectors of the economy are conducive to the 
development of market competition and giving full play to the role of the 
market in optimizing the allocation of resources. 
 6. See JIN PEI, CHANYE ZUZHI JINGJIXUE [ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION] 15 
(1999).  
 7. See Zhu Qingfang, Jianguo Wushinian Zhongguo Shehui Jingji Jiegou Fasheng Zhongda 
Bianhua [Major Changes in China’s Socio-economic Structure After the Founding of the People’s 
Republic], ZHONGGUO SHEHUI KEXUEYUAN TONGXUN [NEWSLETTER OF THE CHINESE ACADEMY OF 
SOCIAL SCIENCES], Sept. 2, 1999. 
 8. XIANFA art. 11 (1999). 
 9. Id. 
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3. State-Owned Enterprises Are Enjoying Increasingly Greater 
Managerial Autonomy 
Although there currently are more than three hundred thousand state-
owned enterprises in China, only about ten thousand have undertaken 
some sort of a state production plan.10 This means that the majority of 
state-owned enterprises have marketized their business operations. State-
owned enterprises have made important contributions to economic 
construction in China and have played a dominant role in the national 
economy. However, due to the long-term influence of the traditional 
system and its resulting problems, the repetitive economic reconstruction 
over the years, and the rapid changes in the market environment, many 
state-owned enterprises no longer can meet the demands of the market 
economy. Therefore, since the beginning of the economic reformation, the 
Chinese government has explored ways to reform the management system 
of state-owned enterprises. As a result, the reform of state-owned 
enterprises has become the key to the success or failure of economic 
reform in China. 
In 1995, China directed its state-owned enterprises to establish a 
modern enterprise management system.11 The modern enterprise 
management system aims to clarify property rights, determine rights and 
responsibilities, separate the functions of the government from those of 
enterprises, develop a scientific management system, and perfect decision 
making, implementation, and supervision mechanisms. This will enable 
enterprises to truly become the legal persons and the principals of the 
market that can operate their businesses independently and assume 
responsibilities for their own profits or losses.12 By 1999, through 
integration, mergers, leasing, contracting, the establishment of a 
shareholding cooperation system, sales, transfers, and bankruptcies, about 
75% to 90% of small state-owned enterprises had reorganized their 
management systems.13 Of the fourteen thousand medium and large state-
owned enterprises, one-third reorganized as limited liability companies or 
 10. See JIN PEI, supra note 6, at 15. 
 11. According to the Decision on the Establishment of a Socialist Market System, which the 
Fourteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party adopted at the Plenary Meeting on 
Nov. 14, 1993, establishing a modern enterprise management system is an extremely important 
component of creating a socialist market system. To implement this Decision, the State Council 
selected one hundred state-owned enterprises in 1995 and began experimenting with enterprise 
management. See FASHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], Feb. 8, 1995.  
 12. See Jiang Zemin, Address at the Meeting of the 15th National Congress of the Communist 
Party of China (Sept. 12, 1997).  
 
 13. See JIN PEI, supra note 6, at 15. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol1/iss1/10
p201 Wang book pages.doc  10/14/02   4:09 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] THE PROSPECT OF ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION IN CHINA 205 
 
 
 
 
 
companies limited by shares.14 By the first half of 1998, about 309,000 
limited liability companies had reorganized themselves in accordance with 
the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China.15 Among them, 
more than 10,000 were reorganized state-owned enterprises or newly 
established companies with state-owned enterprises as their main 
subsidiaries, more than 4,000 were companies limited by shares,16 and 745 
were listed companies.17 These statistics show that with both the 
implementation of a shareholding system for state assets and the 
circulation and transfer of state-owned stocks in the market, state-owned 
enterprises will cut off their subordinate relationship with the government 
and free themselves from the control of various government departments.18 
This serves as the ultimate goal of economic reform in China as well as a 
pre-condition for both the reinvigoration of state-owned enterprises and 
the introduction of competition mechanisms into China's economic life. 
4. China Already Possesses an Open Market Structure 
Since the promulgation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China 
on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures in 1979,19 China has 
implemented the policy of absorbing direct investment by foreign 
enterprises. During this time, China established five special economic 
zones,20 fourteen coastal “open cities,”21 and several coastal economic 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 17. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Since 1999, the state has paid tremendous attention to carrying out the strategic 
reorganization of state-owned enterprises in light of different conditions. Apart from a very small 
number of industries that the state must monopolize, all state-owned enterprises in competitive areas 
must rearrange assets and readjust structures using various methods. The large and medium-sized 
enterprises that meet the necessary conditions should develop gradually into shareholding enterprises 
with different sources of investment. See Communist Party Discusses Industrial Reform With Non-
Communist Parties, RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE’S DAILY], Sept. 24, 1999, available at http://english. 
peopledaily.com.cn/199909/24/enc_19990924001008_TopNews.html [hereinafter Communist Party 
Discusses]. Cf. Strengthening the Belief in Running Well State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), ZHENLI DE 
ZHUIQIU [SEEKING TRUTH], Sept. 24, 1999 (hailing the decisions made on SOEs). 
 19. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongwai Hezi Jingying Qiye Fa [Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures] (1979), translated in THE LAWS OF THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1979-1982 150 (1987). A current version is available online at http:// 
www.qis.net/chinalaw/prclaw11.htm. 
 20. These special economic zones include Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen, and Hainan.  
 21. These “open cities” include Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, 
Nantong, Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Zhanjiang, Guangzhou, and Beihai. Since 1992, the 
central government has designated many of the cities along the Yangtze River, which were provincial 
capital cities in the border areas and interior areas, to adopt the coastal “open city” policy.  
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development regions in the Yangtse Delta, Zhujiang Delta, and Xiatang 
Delta areas, thereby establishing a structure for opening China to the 
outside world in various directions and through various channels.  
By July 2000, China had absorbed more than US$327 billion in direct 
foreign investment and established more than 353,000 foreign-invested 
enterprises.22 From 1993 to 2000, China absorbed the largest amount of 
foreign investment of any developing country in the world. Globally, 
China ranks second only to the United States in foreign investment. Of the 
five hundred most well known transnational corporations, nearly four 
hundred have made investments in China.23 Foreign-invested enterprises 
have optimized their industrial structures gradually. These foreign 
enterprises have brought increased capital, technology, and employment 
opportunities to China, as well as new management methods, thereby 
injecting tremendous vitality into the Chinese markets and economy. 
Throughout the past twenty years, China’s foreign trade has expanded 
more than sixteenfold. Its world ranking rose from number thirty-two in 
1978 to number eleven in 1995, and ultimately to number seven in 2000.24 
This demonstrates that the Chinese market is compatible with, and able to 
compete within, the international marketplace, as well as the fact that the 
Chinese economy, to a large extent, has integrated into the international 
economy. 
B. Restrictions on Competition in the Chinese Economy 
Although China has introduced the competition mechanism into its 
economy, due to the lingering influence of the old economic system, many 
government organs still may treat enterprises differently or practice a high 
degree of departmental or market division. This results in the retention of 
many low-efficiency enterprises as well as the failure of many high-
efficiency enterprises to compete effectively in the market. In addition, 
with the introduction of market competition, various acts of unfair 
 22. See China: Developing Country Attracting Most Foreign Investment, RENMIN RIBAO 
[PEOPLE’S DAILY], Sept. 19, 2000, available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200009/19/ 
eng20000919_50854.html. 
 23. See Background: China’s Introduction to Foreign Investment, RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE’S 
DAILY], Sept. 7, 2000, available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200009/07/eng20000907_ 
49988.html. 
 24. See Research Group for the Foreign Trade Situation of China, Chukou Zhiyue Yinsu 
Xianzeng - Zhongguo Duiwai Maoyi Xingshi 2001 Nian Chongji Baogao [Export Restraint Factors 
Increasing - The Spring 2001 Report on the Foreign Trade Situation of China], 6 GUOJI MAOYI 
[INTERTRADE] 18 (2001). 
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competition have emerged. Therefore, at the current stage of economic life 
in China, market competition is both insufficient and seriously distorted. 
1. Economic Restrictions on Market Competition 
Economic restrictions on competition specifically refer to acts of 
enterprises that restrict competition. Both Chinese and foreign experiences 
show that the market itself does not contain a mechanism that upholds fair 
and free competition. On the contrary, in order to reduce pressure from 
their competitors and avoid risks, enterprises constantly implement various 
means to acquire a monopoly within the relevant market. At the current 
stage of development, where the market is still immature and the market 
mechanism still imperfect, acts of enterprises that restrict competition 
occur frequently. 
a. Coordinated Restrictions on Market Competition 
Coordinated restrictions on competition refer to the acts of various 
legally independent enterprises of coordinating with each other to restrict 
competition through the conclusion of contracts or tacit agreements on 
prices, production, sales, and other matters relating to market competition. 
For example, during the air conditioner price war in Nanjing in 1993, eight 
large state-owned department stores coordinated to impose maximum 
prices on air conditioners to defeat their competitors.25 In addition, in 
1994, fifty-one pager service providers jointly imposed restrictions on 
service fees.26 
The “8.9 Incident,” or “15-day Price Alliance," represents a typical 
example of coordinated price restriction.27 The seventeen enterprises in 
this alliance formed two price cartels. One was a production price cartel 
consisting of Little Swan, Cherry, Haier, and six other washing machine 
producers, whose alliance agreement required that all cartel members 
adopt unified prices and other related policies toward retailers.28 The other 
cartel was a selling price cartel, consisting of the Beijing Department 
Store, Xidan Shopping Center, Longfu Shopping Center, and five other 
major shopping centers, whose alliance agreement stipulated that all cartel 
members implement the unified retail prices of washing machines set by 
 25. See NANJING RIBAO [NANJING DAILY], May 22, 1993.  
 26. See RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE’S DAILY], Jan. 12, 1995.  
 27. See Xi Weihang & Lu Wei, 15-day Price Alliance, BEIJING RIBAO [BEIJING DAILY], Mar. 8, 
1996. 
 
 28. Id.  
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the producers.29 The purpose of this price coordination was to restrict the 
price competition between the washing machine producers and retailers. 
In the last two years, the intensification of competition has increased 
the number of price alliances among competitors. For example: (1) in May 
1999, eight major kinescope producers established an alliance in Beijing 
and imposed a one month moratorium on production to prevent further 
price drops;30 (2) in March 2000, major air conditioner producers formed 
an alliance in Nanjing;31 and (3) recently, nine major color television 
producers (including Konka, TCL, and Chuangwei) met in Shengzhen for 
the first meeting of their price alliance in the color television 
manufacturing industry.32 These examples illustrate the harmful effects of 
price cartels on consumer interest. However, because the above-mentioned 
cartels possessed a limited number of members and existed in a limited 
number of industries, their effects on competition were far less harmful 
than the "industrial self-discipline prices" adopted by various industries in 
1998 under the guidance of the relevant government departments.  
One always should view “industrial self-discipline prices” as a 
synonym for government intervention in price competition among 
enterprises. In August 1998, the State Economic and Trade Commission 
issued its “Opinions On Self-Discipline Pricing For Certain Industrial 
Products,”33 which, on the grounds that it was necessary to end price wars 
and disorderly competition, demanded that the producers of certain 
industrial products observe the minimum price limits set by their 
respective trade associations. The twenty categories of these regulated 
products included plate glass, cement, cars, agricultural vehicles, and 
electricity generators. The Transportation Vehicle Branch of the China 
Agricultural Machinery Association (TVB), which first advocated the 
imposition of industrial self-discipline prices, even imposed fines on the 
Shandong Shifeng Group and other enterprises for failing to observe the 
industrial self-discipline prices. The TVB forced the Shifeng Group to pay 
a fine of 800,000 yuan and an “inspection fee” of 153,000 yuan.34  
 29. Id.  
 30. See Wang Chenbo & Shen Yu, Four Questions to Chinese Antimonopoly, GONGREN RIBAO 
[WORKER’S DAILY], Apr. 20, 2001.  
 31. Id.  
 32. Id.  
 33. See RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE’S DAILY], Sept. 11, 1998, available at http://english.people 
daily.com.cn/199809/11/index.htm. 
 34. See RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE’S DAILY], Oct. 19, 1998, available at http://english.people 
daily.com.cn/199810/19/index.htm. 
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“Industrial self-discipline prices” operate as a type of compulsory price 
cartel because they force enterprises to sell their products according to 
“coordinated prices,” which the government sets without their prior 
consent. Forcing enterprises to sell their products at industrial self-
discipline prices is unreasonable because the government bases the prices 
on the average costs within a particular industry, which exceeds the 
individual costs of more efficient enterprises. Industrial self-discipline 
prices restrict the scope of price reduction for these enterprises and deprive 
them of the opportunity to expand their production and operation. The 
Shifeng Group was correct to criticize this practice as “punishing the 
advanced and protecting the backward.”35 
b. Obstructive Restrictions on Market Competition 
Obstructive restrictions on competition refer to the practice of 
enterprises of concluding compulsory agreements on tie-in sales, the 
restriction of resale prices, or other exclusive restrictions to either limit the 
managerial autonomy of competitors or place competitors in a 
disadvantaged position by limiting or refusing to provide goods. Since 
enterprises engage in this kind of restriction on competition at various 
stages of production, the restrictions are vertical in nature. Since these 
restrictions work to obstruct others from taking part in competition, they 
commonly are viewed as obstructive restrictions on competition. 
In the current Chinese economy, obstructive restrictions on competition 
occur primarily in the areas of telecommunications, electricity, water, gas, 
and other public utilities. For example, postal and telecommunications 
offices forced telephone users to buy designated telephone sets,36 power 
supply offices forced their customers to buy designated power distribution 
boxes,37 and water companies forced consumers to buy the designated 
water supply equipment.38 During the installation of gas pipelines in the 
housing districts in some cities, gas companies forced the residents to buy 
gas stoves and water heaters sold by the gas companies that were much 
more expensive than similar products in the market. The gas companies 
 35. Id.  
 36. See FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], Nov. 21, 1996.  
 37. Li Bida, Longduan Xinwei Zai Zhongguo de Zhuyao Biaoxian Jiqi Falv Jiandu [Main 
Manifestations of Monopoly in China and Their Legal Supervision], in FANLONGDUANFA YU 
SHICHANG JINGJI [ANTIMONOPOLY LAW AND THE MARKET ECONOMY] 10-12 (Wang Xiaoye ed., 
1998). 
 38. Id. 
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either refused to issue certificates for the use of the gas or cut the gas 
supply to users that refused to buy their products.39 
2. Administrative Restrictions on Market Competition 
Administrative restrictions on competition refer to the acts of the 
Chinese government and its subordinate organs that abuse administrative 
power to restrict competition. These acts abuse administrative power 
because they do not qualify as either normal economic administrative 
actions that the government carries out for the maintenance of the socialist 
economic order or the industrial, financial, or other economic and social 
policies adopted by the government for the macro-regulation of the 
national economy. China currently is transitioning from a planned 
economy to a market economy and the transformation of the government’s 
function of economic administration presently is incomplete. As a result, 
administrative restrictions on competition coming from the old economic 
system represent a very serious problem and a large obstacle to the 
establishment of effective competition in China. Administrative 
restrictions on competition primarily take the following forms: 
a. Departmental Monopoly and Regional Monopoly 
Currently, Chinese academics summarize administrative restrictions on 
competition as departmental monopoly and regional monopoly or, more 
vividly, vertical monopoly and horizontal monopoly. Vertical monopoly 
refers to the administrative companies that various government 
departments approve and establish. They include: (1) companies that 
function both as administrative organs and producers or business 
operators; (2) large enterprise groups with the task of industrial 
administration; and (3) enterprises affiliated with certain bureaus or 
ministries that consequently enjoy favorable treatment. Since these 
companies possess governmental authorization, they have competitive 
advantages that other enterprises could not possibly have. In relation to 
certain products, the enterprises operate in government-created monopoly 
positions in terms of the production, sale, and purchase of raw materials, 
which thereby unfairly restrict competition. In China, critics refer to this 
phenomenon as “conducting business operations by abusing power.”40 
 39. See FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], Sept. 29, 1995.  
 40. Respected economist Hu Angang recently stated that administrative monopolies simply are 
corrupt. See BEIJING QINGNIAN BAO [BEIJING YOUTH DAILY], Sept. 24, 2001, available at 
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Horizontal monopoly refers to local protectionism. It consists of acts of 
local governments that either prohibit certain foreign products from 
entering the local market or prevent local raw materials from flowing into 
other regions, thereby dividing the originally unified national market into 
many narrow local markets. Since the beginning of the economic 
reformation and the separation of the financial powers of central and local 
governments, local governments have developed independent interests.41 
As a result, the conflicts of interest between different regions have 
intensified and local protectionism has peaked. 
Some local governments refuse to issue business licenses to enterprises 
that engage in wholesaling or retailing of commodities originating in other 
regions, and often arbitrarily confiscate their goods or impose fines. Some 
local governments even go as far as setting up checkpoints at regional 
border areas to pursue, obstruct, and intercept those who sell commodities 
originating in other regions.42 For example, during the 1994 beer war in 
the Jixi Region of the Helongjiang Province, the counties and cities 
surrounding Jixi City confiscated, within a period of eight months and by 
means of setting up checkpoints and conducting unannounced inspections, 
thirteen thousand crates of bottled beer produced in Jixi City.43 In 1997, 
the government of Gushi County in the Henan Province issued a special 
order to prevent chemical fertilizer originating in other regions from 
flowing into the county. The order stipulated: 
In order to protect the production of chemical fertilizer in the 
county, the county government prohibits any units or individual 
(including supply and marketing cooperatives) from purchasing 
carbonic ammonia produced in other areas. Those who violate this 
prohibition shall, apart from confiscation of the goods and illegal 
income, be imposed severe sanctions according to the relevant 
regulations. The leaders of the relevant county people’s 
governments and of the relevant administrative departments also 
http://www.bjyouth.com.cn. 
 41. Article 8 of the Budget Law of the People’s Republic of China mandates that the central 
government and the local governments shall separate taxation. The central government and the local 
governments divide tax items and categories at different levels according to their different 
responsibilities. See Rules for the Implementation of the Budget Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (Nov. 2, 1995). 
 42. See Li, supra note 37, at 11. 
 43. See FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], Apr. 22, 2000. 
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shall be investigated for administrative or economic 
responsibilities.44  
With the development of the automotive industry in China, the 
competition between certain automobile producers also has taken on a 
strong color of local protectionism. For example, ever since October 1, 
1999, the Hubei Province, which produces Citröen cars, has imposed a 
seventy thousand-yuan “fee for helping enterprises with special 
difficulties” on the purchase of each Santana car, which the Shanghai 
Municipality produces. The Hubei Province imposed this fee in response 
to the Shanghai Municipality’s policy of charging only a twenty thousand-
yuan license fee for Santana cars, but an eighty thousand-yuan license fee 
for other cars.45 This kind of local protectionism has harmed consumer 
interests by restricting their rights to select commodities, restricting the 
production scale of enterprises, and impeding the development of the 
automobile industry in China. 
b. “Forced Marriages” in Mergers 
The “forced marriage” in the merger of enterprises represents another 
typical form of administrative restriction on competition. It refers to 
situations where the government forces either an enterprise to join an 
enterprise group or an economically efficient enterprise to merge with an 
economically inefficient enterprise. Some government departments argue 
that the significance of mergers lies in the interests of the economy as a 
whole rather than that of the individual enterprises. Therefore, in 
establishing enterprise groups, the government often will ask enterprises to 
sacrifice their own interests for the interests of the economy. The 
government, according to the policy of the “equal distribution of wealth,” 
has asked certain economically efficient enterprises to merge with 
enterprises that are either poorly managed or near the brink of 
bankruptcy.46 Under these circumstances, many enterprises cannot benefit 
from the merger in any way, and in fact, they often have to pay 
 44. Li, supra note 37, at 11.  
 45. KONG XIANGJUN, ZHONGGUO XIANXING FANLONGDUANFA LIJIE YU SHIYONG [HOW TO 
UNDERSTAND AND APPLY THE CHINESE ANTIMONOPOLY LAW] 162-63 (2001). 
 46. For example, the largest merger in China occurred when Qilu Petrochemical Company 
merged with both the Zibo Petrochemical Factory and the Zibo Chemical Fibres Factory in 1997. This 
merger was an administrative measure designed to rescue two merged enterprises from very difficult 
economic positions. Wu Baoguo, the Vice-Premier Minister of the State Council, stated that this 
merger was a helpful probe for the comprehensive utilization of market and administrative power. See 
JINGJI RIBAO [ECONOMIC DAILY], Nov. 11, 1997. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol1/iss1/10
p201 Wang book pages.doc  10/14/02   4:09 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] THE PROSPECT OF ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION IN CHINA 213 
 
 
 
 
 
accumulated debt resulting from the merger and place the resulting surplus 
workers in alternate employment.47 This has weakened the economic 
power of these enterprises and resulted in the deterioration of the 
conditions necessary for effective market competition. “Forced marriages” 
are harmful practices that seriously impede and restrict competition. 
The primary theoretical basis for the Chinese government’s preference 
for mergers is that the expansion of the production scale of enterprises 
may bring about economies of scale. Today, with the large scale 
rearrangement of assets of state-owned enterprises, an unprecedented 
movement toward merging state-owned enterprises is under way in China. 
Unfortunately, however, these acts of rearrangement are, to a large extent, 
the acts of the government rather than state enterprises.  
The Guangdong Province recently adopted a plan to rearrange the 
assets of state-owned enterprises throughout the entire province. This plan 
will reorganize more than 1,546 state-owned enterprises in the province 
into twenty-three large corporations.48 The provincial Party Committee 
must approve the appointments of all executives and directors of the newly 
reorganized corporations.49 The rearranged corporations, including the 
provincial transportation group, provincial commercial group, provincial 
light industry group, and provincial machinery group, reveal that most of 
these corporations are industrial monopoly groups within the 
administrative area of the Guangdong Province. It is not difficult to 
imagine that, under the current conditions of the highly divided Chinese 
markets, regional industrial monopoly groups likely will have a negative 
effect on market competition.50 
3. The Socialist Market Economy Needs a System That Protects 
Competition 
The Fourteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, 
held in 1992, was a landmark in China’s economic reform. The Congress’ 
official report not only announced to the world that China planned to 
 47. See discussion supra note 46. In the course of this merger, Qilu Petrochemical Company 
accepted more than three billion yuan in debt and took on about five thousand employees. This merger 
increased the proportion of Qilu Petrochemical Company’s assets and liabilities from 41% to 60%. See 
JINGJI RIBAO [ECONOMIC DAILY], Nov. 24, 1997. 
 48. See Qian Duo Guoqi Zu 23 Jia Dagongsi [More Than 1,000 State-Owned Enterprises Have 
Been Reorganized into 23 Large Corporations], SHENZHEN SHANGBAO [SHENZHEN BUSINESS NEWS], 
May 24, 2000.  
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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implement a socialist market economy, but it also clearly pointed out the 
significance of the market mechanism to the development of the national 
economy: 
The purpose of the socialist market economic system, which China 
is going to establish, is, under the macro-control of the socialist 
state, to give full play to the basic role of the market in the 
allocation of resources; to ensure that economic activities are 
carried out in accordance with the law of value and adapted to the 
changes in relations between supply and demand; to use the lever of 
price and the competition mechanism to allocate resources to the 
places where they can produce the best economic results; to 
implement the system of selecting the superior and eliminating the 
inferior so as to give pressure and impetus to the enterprises; and to 
promote the timely adjustment of production and demand by taking 
advantage of the sensitivity of the market to various economic 
signals.51  
This document confirmed that some of the basic mechanisms under the 
market economy, such as the market and competition mechanisms, also 
serve as the basic mechanisms in a socialist market economy. It also 
confirmed that both price regulations and market competition constitute 
the intrinsic economic order of a socialist market economy as well as the 
importance of protecting competition to the deepening of economic reform 
and the establishment of a socialist market economy in China. 
Since a socialist market economy is a market economy, China must 
link it with competition. It must use: (1) the competition mechanism to 
eliminate low-efficiency enterprises, unreasonable production procedures, 
and low quality products so as to promote the rational distribution of 
social resources; (2) the price mechanism to let the enterprises decide their 
own production and operation plans to both improve the relationship 
between supply and demand and satisfy the needs of the market; and (3) 
competition as an incentive to encourage enterprises to update their 
technology and products, improve management, and reduce the costs and 
prices of products so as to achieve maximum output with minimum input. 
The promotion of competition is also of special importance to the 
current economic reform in China, which possesses two main aspects. The 
first aspect concerns the establishment of both a unified national market 
 51. See Jiang Zemin, Address at the Meeting of the 14th National Congress of the Communist 
Party of China (Oct. 18, 1992). 
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system and a market mechanism. Without competition, no market or 
market mechanism will exist because competition is the market 
mechanism. The second concerns the reform of enterprises, which means 
establishing a modern enterprise system, transforming the management 
mechanism of state-owned enterprises (especially that of the large and 
medium-sized state-owned enterprises), and pushing the enterprises into 
the market to inject greater vitality into them. Competition plays a decisive 
role in the invigoration of enterprises because the vitality of the enterprises 
lies in their ability to continuously update their organizational structure, 
technology, and products in accordance with the needs of the market. 
Without the pressure from market competition, enterprises do not have the 
incentive to continuously readjust and develop themselves, engage in 
creative activities, or improve their management control systems. 
Competition serves an indispensable role in invigorating all enterprises. 
Based on primarily historical and structural reasons, China should 
concentrate its current antimonopoly efforts on state-owned enterprises. 
Breaking up the monopolies of state-owned enterprises is of great 
importance for the following reasons: 
First, doing so will improve the economic efficiency of enterprises. 
High efficiency enterprises can achieve maximum output with minimum 
input, retain a spirit of creativity and innovation, and react most acutely to 
technological advancements and the needs of the market. Experiences 
show that without breaking the monopoly of state-owned enterprises, it is 
very difficult to solve their widespread problem of low efficiency. 
Therefore, apart from a very few key industries, the state should introduce 
competition into all areas the economy. The reform in China’s 
telecommunications industry has proved that breaking the monopoly of 
state-owned enterprises will raise their economic efficiency and reduce 
their production costs.52 
Second, doing so will improve state finance. Both Chinese and foreign 
experiences show that monopolistic enterprises receive government 
subsidies, with the unprofitable enterprises receiving more subsidies than 
the profitable enterprises. Regardless of whether the government grants the 
subsidies openly or covertly, they all come from state coffers. In China, 
 52. The emergence of China Unicom (China United Telecommunications Corporation) in 1994 
ended the telecommunications monopoly in China. In addition, by the end of 2000, China Railway 
Communication Co. Ltd. (CRC) had become a new competitor in the telecommunications industry. 
Although the market shares of China Unicom and CRC remain small, the increase in competition 
produces tremendous benefits for consumers. For example, Beijing residents who wanted to install a 
home telephone ten years ago had to pay a five thousand-yuan installation charge. However, the 
competition in the telecommunications market forced the abandonment of this charge in July 2001. 
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the vast majority of state-owned enterprises receive various forms of 
government subsidies. The Chinese people often criticize state-owned 
enterprises for living on state subsidies and bank loans. Breaking the 
monopolies of state-owned enterprises likely will raise their economic 
efficiency and reduce their dependence on government subsidies. 
Moreover, allowing private investors to enter into the economic areas that 
state-owned enterprises monopolize will reduce the state’s investment in 
these areas. This will reduce government subsidies and investment, 
increase the state’s tax revenue, and improve the state’s financial 
condition, thereby enabling the state to accomplish goals such as 
developing educational and public health projects and improving the social 
security system.53 
Third, breaking up the monopolies of state-owned enterprises will 
improve the state’s macro-control over the economy. The price of 
products, investment plans, and the employment rates of state-owned 
monopolistic enterprises are important to the state's macro-economic 
policy. Breaking up the monopoly of these enterprises will improve their 
productivity, reduce their costs, and increase their output, and therefore 
will improve the state’s macro-control over the economy in the long run. 
Although breaking up the monopolies could create significant 
unemployment, the entrance of other business operators into the market 
will create new employment opportunities. 
II. THE CURRENT SITUATION OF AND EXISTING PROBLEMS IN THE 
ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION IN CHINA 
A. The Current Situation of Antimonopoly Legislation in China 
The Interim Provisions for the Promotion and Protection of 
Competition in the Socialist Economy, promulgated by the State Council 
in October 1980, represented the first legislative attempt to combat 
monopolies, including government monopolies. The Interim Provisions 
stipulated that “[i]n economic life, apart from the products which are to be 
exclusively traded in by the departments or units designated by the state, 
no other products may be monopolized or exclusively traded in.”54 “In 
 53. According to the Decision on Issues Relating to the Reform and Development of State-
Owned Enterprises, the central government intends to take measures (including selling public assets 
and reasonably adjusting the structure of financial expenditures) to raise money for social security. See 
Communist Party Discusses, supra note 18. 
 54. Interim Provisions for the Promotion and Protection of Competition in the Socialist Economy 
art. 3 (1980), reprinted in ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO FALU QUANSHU 1949-1989 
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carrying out competition, efforts must be made to break regional 
blockades and departmental divisions. No region or department may 
blockade the market or prohibit the sale . . . of commodities originating in 
other regions or departments.”55 The Interim Provisions requested that 
departments in charge of industry, transportation, finance, and trade revise 
the existing rules and regulations and delete from them provisions that 
obstruct competition. The Interim Provisions also authorized the relevant 
regions and departments to adopt implementation measures in accordance 
with the spirit of the Interim Provisions that would ensure the smooth 
functioning of competition. Ever since, the government has promulgated a 
series of antimonopoly policies, laws, and regulations to effectuate this 
purpose. 
1. Regulations That Prohibit Restrictive Agreements 
Under this category, the most important regulations are those that 
prohibit price cartels. The Chinese government adopted the Pricing Law at 
the Twenty-Ninth Meeting of the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress in December 1997, which stipulates that a business 
operator may not “collude with others to manipulate the market price, thus 
harming the lawful rights and interests of other business operators or 
consumers.”56  
According to Article 40 of the Pricing Law, any business operator who 
colludes to manipulate market prices either may be required to pay 
restitution, or may have any illegal gains confiscated and be fined not 
more than five times the amount of the illegal gains.57 If there are no 
illegal gains, the violator may be subject to a disciplinary warning and 
fine.58 If the circumstances are serious, the business operator must suspend 
operation of the business or the relevant administrative department for 
industry and commerce will revoke the operator’s business license 
permanently.59 Article 40 also provides for the organs responsible for 
confirming business collusions. If the collusion is national in nature, the 
relevant department for pricing within the State Council will confirm it. If 
the collusion is regional in nature and is at or below the provincial level, 
[COLLECTION OF LAWS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1989] 1137-38 (Wang Huaian et 
al. eds., 1989). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Pricing Law art. 14, para. 1 (1997). 
 57. Id. art. 40. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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the relevant departments for pricing under the people’s governments of 
provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the 
Central Government are responsible for confirmation. Supplementing 
Article 40 is Article 41, which states that any business operator who 
causes any overpayment by either consumers or other business operators 
due to illegal pricing shall return the overpaid money along with 
compensation for any consequential damages.60 
Complementing the Pricing Law is the Law Against Unfair 
Competition, which stipulates that “[t]enderers shall not submit tenders in 
collusion with one another to force the tender price up or down. A tenderer 
shall not collaborate with the party inviting tenders to exclude competitors 
from fair competition.”61 Collusion between bidders constitutes a 
horizontal restriction on competition whereas collusion between bidders 
and tender-inviters constitutes a vertical restriction. However, on August 
30, 1999, the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s 
Congress adopted the Law on Bidding and Inviting Bids, more commonly 
known as the Bidding Law. Apart from its provisions regarding bidding 
and inviting bids, the Bidding Law contains a prohibition against 
collusion. 
Some local regulations contain more detailed provisions than the 
Bidding Law on agreements that restrict competition. For example, Article 
19 of the Regulations of the Hainan Special Economic Zone Against 
Unfair Competition clearly stipulate that acts such as dividing a sales 
market, boycotting specific enterprises in purchasing or selling, fixing 
prices, restricting the production quantity or sales volume, and colluding 
in the bidding process are all illegal. These regulations operate even more 
stringently than the national Law Against Unfair Competition. 
2. Regulations That Oppose Alliances of Large-Scale Enterprises 
In 1987, the State Commission for Economic Restructuring and the 
National Economy Commission jointly issued Opinions on the 
Establishment and Development of Enterprise Groups, which stipulated 
that “[t]he establishment of enterprise groups must be in accordance with 
the principle of encouraging competition and preventing monopoly.”62 The 
Opinions also stated that “as a general rule, no monopoly enterprise 
 60. Id. art. 41. 
 61. Law Against Unfair Competition art. 15 (1993). 
 62. State Commission for Economic Restructuring & National Economy Commission, Opinions 
on the Establishment and Development of Enterprise Groups art. 5 (1987) [hereinafter Opinions]. 
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groups shall be established within an industry, and competition between 
enterprise groups within the same industry shall be encouraged so as to 
promote technological advancement and increase economic efficiency.”63 
In addition, the Interim Measures for the Merger of Enterprises, jointly 
promulgated by the State Commission for Economic Restructuring, the 
State Planning Commission, and other state organs in 1989, also pointed 
out that mergers must be conducive to economies of scale while not 
harming market competition. 
3. Regulations That Prohibit the Abuse of a Market Dominant Position 
Currently, China’s legislation in this area primarily concerns public 
utility enterprises and other companies that enjoy legal monopoly 
positions. The Law Against Unfair Competition stipulates that “[p]ublic 
utility enterprises or other operators having monopolistic status according 
to law shall not force others to buy the goods of the operators designated 
by [the public utility enterprises or other operators] so as to exclude other 
operators from competing fairly.”64 In 1993, the State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce promulgated the Provisions on the Prohibition of 
Public Utility Enterprises from Committing Restrictive Acts Against 
Competition,65 which listed various competition restrictions, including 
restricting users to purchasing designated products, tie-in sales, refusing to 
provide products to users who reject a business operator’s unreasonable 
conditions, and arbitrarily charging fees. 
According to the Law Against Unfair Competition, if a public utility 
enterprise or any other company with a legal monopoly abuses its 
advantage or restricts competition, the administrative organs for industry 
and commerce will order the enterprise to cease any illegal acts and may 
impose a fine of not less than fifty thousand yuan but not more than two 
hundred thousand yuan, depending on the severity of the circumstances.66 
In addition, according to the Provisions, users or consumers suffering 
losses as a result of any abuse may, in accordance with Article 20 of the 
Law Against Unfair Competition, file suit in the people’s court to recover 
any losses.67 The state organs that have the power to investigate and deal 
 63. Id. 
 64. Law Against Unfair Competition art. 6 (1993). 
 65. Provisions on the Prohibition of Public Utility Enterprises from Committing Restrictive Acts 
Against Competition (1993), available at http://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/China/Decision/cndec05.html 
[hereinafter Provisions on the Prohibition]. 
 66. Law Against Unfair Competition art. 23 (1993). 
 67. Provisions on the Prohibition art. 8 (1993). 
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with restrictive acts of public utility enterprises are the industrial and 
commercial administrative bureaus at either the provincial level or the 
level of cities divided into districts. 
Other articles in the Law Against Unfair Competition prohibit the 
abuse of dominant positions. For example, a business operator may not, 
for the purpose of forcing out his competitors, sell his commodities at 
prices lower than cost.68 The business operator also may not, against the 
will of the purchasers, conduct a tie-in sale of commodities or attach any 
other unreasonable conditions to such a sale.69 In addition, the Pricing Law 
states: 
Apart from disposing of perishable, seasonal, and overstocked 
commodities at reduced prices according to law, a business operator 
may not dump commodities at prices lower than production costs in 
order to drive out rivals or monopolize the market, thus disrupting 
normal production and operational order and impairing the interests 
of the State or the lawful rights and interests of other business 
operators.70  
Additionally, the Law on Electric Power stipulates that:  
The power-supply enterprise in any electricity service area shall be 
obligated to supply electricity to the consumers within its service 
area in accordance with the regulations of the state. It may not, in 
violation of state regulations, refuse to supply electricity to any unit 
or individual within their service area that applied for service.71 
4. Regulations That Oppose Administrative Restrictions on 
Competition 
Since the 1980s, the State Council has promulgated many regulations 
prohibiting administrative restrictions on competition. For example, the 
Council sought to resolve the problem of businesses misusing 
administrative powers by promulgating many regulations on screening and 
rectifying various kinds of companies. The regulations both emphasize the 
separation of enterprise management from government administration and 
prohibit party or government organs from creating enterprises. 
 68. Law Against Unfair Competition art. 11 (1993). 
 69. Id. art. 12. 
 70. Pricing Law art. 14, para. 2 (1997). 
 71. Law of the People’s Republic of China on Electric Power art. 26 (1995). 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol1/iss1/10
p201 Wang book pages.doc  10/14/02   4:09 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] THE PROSPECT OF ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION IN CHINA 221 
 
 
 
 
 
Specifically, the Decision of the Party Central Committee and State 
Council on Strictly Prohibiting Party and Government Organs and Party 
and Government Cadres from Engaging in Commerce or Running 
Enterprises provided that: 
The leading organs of the Party and the government, especially the 
economic organs and their leaders, must appropriately perform their 
functions of leading and organizing economic construction, adhere 
to the principle of separation of the functions of government from 
that of enterprises . . . They are strictly prohibited from abusing 
their power to engage in business, set up enterprises, seek personal 
gains, and harm the interests of the people in violation of the 
regulations of the Party and of the State.72 
The State Council also opposed local protectionism through the 
Circular on Breaking Regional Market Blockades and Further Promoting 
the Circulation of Commodities, which it issued in November 1990. The 
circular pointed out that production enterprises, after fulfilling the tasks of 
production for the allocation of products according to the state’s 
mandatory plan and the purchase-and-sale contracts, possess the right to 
sell their products throughout the country. In addition, enterprises in the 
areas of industry, commerce, and materials and equipment may purchase 
the products they need independently. No region or department may set up 
blockades to interfere in any of these activities. 
With respect to the prohibitions of restrictive abuses of administrative 
power, the most important such prohibition is the Law Against Unfair 
Competition, which stipulates that: 
A local government and its subordinate departments shall not abuse 
their administrative power to force others to buy the goods of the 
operators designated by them so as to restrict the lawful business 
activities of other operators. A local government and its subordinate 
departments shall not abuse their administrative power to restrict the 
entry of goods from other parts of the country into the local market 
or the flow of local goods to markets in other parts of the country.73 
 72. Guanyu Yanjin Dangzheng Jiguan he Dangzheng Ganbu Jingshang Banqiye de Jueding 
[Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the State Council on Strictly 
Prohibiting Party and Government Organs and Party and Government Cadres from Engaging in 
Commerce and Running Enterprises], Foreword (Dec. 3, 1984). 
 73. Law Against Unfair Competition art. 7 (1993). 
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In light of the difficulties in investigating and dealing with abuses of 
administrative power, the Law Against Unfair Competition provides that 
state organs that have abused their administrative power must take 
corrective action. However, if the circumstances are serious, the relevant 
department at the same or higher level of authority may issue 
administrative sanctions to the responsible parties.74 
B. Existing Problems in Chinese Antimonopoly Legislation 
An examination of the provisions above reveals the following major 
problems in current Chinese antimonopoly legislation: 
1. The existing antimonopoly provisions are scattered throughout 
numerous “regulations,” “circulars,” “interim provisions,” and the Law 
Against Unfair Competition, and therefore do not form a complete, 
specialized system of antimonopoly legislation. Some of the provisions 
only express certain intentions of the government. For example, the 
Opinions on the Establishment and Development of Enterprise Groups 
state that “[g]enerally, nationwide monopoly enterprise groups shall not be 
set up within an industry.”75 Does this statement imply that nationwide 
monopolistic enterprises may exist under special circumstances, or that the 
situation where two or three enterprises oligopolize the market within an 
industry is allowed? 
2. The State Council, or the ministries or commission beneath it, issued 
most of the regulations, which therefore lack legal authority. Some 
regulations do not contain provisions on legal responsibility and, as a 
result, lack operability. For example, despite the numerous government 
regulations that prohibit Party and government organs and officials from 
engaging in business or setting up enterprises, many continue to do so. 
According to the statistics from the State Administration of Industry and 
Commerce, companies created by Party or government organs represented 
10% of all newly established companies in 1992.76 The establishment of 
these companies has enabled administrative and government influence to 
enter into markets and encourage unfair and unreasonable market 
activities. 
 74. See id. art. 30. 
 75. Opinions art. 5 (1987). 
 76. See Guanyu Woguo Fanlongduan Lifa Ruogan Wenti de Yanjin [Several Issues Concerning 
the Antimonopoly Legislation in China], JINGJI GONGZUO TONGXUN [ECON. WORK NEWSLETTER] 
(State Econ. and Trade Comm’n, Beijing, People’s Republic of China), Mar. 1, 1995, at 1-2, available 
at http://eastasian.lib.umn.edu/gztxun/gztx955.html. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol1/iss1/10
p201 Wang book pages.doc  10/14/02   4:09 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] THE PROSPECT OF ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION IN CHINA 223 
 
 
 
 
 
3. The sanctions against government and administrative restrictions on 
competition are ineffective. According to the Law Against Unfair 
Competition, any person or entity that abuses government or 
administrative power to restrict competition will be ordered by 
administrative organs at higher levels to make corrections.77 The Law 
Against Unfair Competition does not allow for the victims of such acts to 
file lawsuits in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Law.78 The 
current provisions are insufficient. If the administrative organs at higher 
levels ignore abuses of power by their subordinate organs, or try to 
minimize the legal consequences of these abuses, the legitimate rights and 
interests of victims will not be protected and abuses will continue to occur. 
4. The existing antimonopoly organs are ineffective. Antimonopoly law 
differs from other laws, including the Law Against Unfair Competition. Its 
task is to prevent large enterprise groups, monopolistic enterprises, and the 
government from restricting competition. This task demands that the 
antimonopoly organs possess sufficient independence and authority. 
However, in the current system, the antimonopoly organs are the 
departments for industrial and commercial administration. This system is 
problematic because cases involving governmental or administrative 
restrictions on competition are very complicated and difficult to 
investigate. If the antimonopoly organs lack sufficient independence or 
authority, administrative and government organs likely will interfere and 
influence the investigations. This ultimately will prevent the antimonopoly 
organs from making decisions in accordance with the law. For example, 
local protectionism in many areas of China prevents some departments for 
industrial and commercial administration from handling cases impartially 
and in accordance with the law. China urgently needs to not only adopt a 
systematic and complete antimonopoly law, but also establish independent 
and authoritative enforcement organs. 
 77. See Law Against Unfair Competition art. 30 (1993). 
 78. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa [Administrative Procedure Law of 
the People’s Republic of China], reprinted in Xinbian Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Changyong Falu 
Fagui Quanshu [The Newly Edited Compendium of the Laws and Regulations of the People’s 
Republic of China] 1698 (Guowuyuan Fazhiju Yanjiushi exam. & approv., 1998). A translation of the 
Administrative Procedure Law also is available online at http://www.gchinalaw.com/cnlaw/ 
reference/codes/adminlaw/procedure.htm. 
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C. The Outline of the Antimonopoly Law 
1. Background and Contents 
The Law Against Unfair Competition was promulgated in 1993. In 
May 1994, the government formed an Antimonopoly Law drafting group. 
Group members came primarily from two main sources: the Department 
of Law and Regulations of the State Economic and Trade Commission and 
the Department of Law and Regulations of the State Administration of 
Industry and Commerce. In the process of drafting and revising the outline 
of the Antimonopoly Law, the drafting committee not only solicited the 
opinions of Chinese antimonopoly experts, but also received support and 
assistance from both international organizations (including the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the 
World Bank, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD)) and several countries (including the United 
States, Germany, Japan, Australia, and South Korea). From 1997 to 1999, 
the OECD organized international seminars with the Antimonopoly Law 
drafting committee and with Chinese antimonopoly experts, conducting 
article by article discussions on the outline of the Antimonopoly Law. 
The outline of the Antimonopoly Law of the People’s Republic of 
China, finalized on November 30, 1999, consists of eight chapters and 
fifty-six articles. Chapter One: General Principles explains the purpose of 
the legislation to end the acts of government organs that abuse their 
administrative powers to restrict competition. Chapter Two: Prohibition of 
the Abuse of Market Dominant Positions defines the concept and the 
different abuses of market dominant positions. Chapter Three: Prohibition 
of Monopoly Agreements defines the prohibited horizontal and vertical 
agreements that restrict competition as well as all applicable exempted 
agreements. Chapter Four: Control of Mergers defines the concept of 
mergers, the application process, prohibited conditions, and required 
special approvals. Chapter Five: Administrative Monopoly defines the 
various forms of administrative monopolies, including geographical and 
industrial monopolies. Chapter Six: Antimonopoly Authorities provides 
for the functions and powers of antimonopoly authorities, as well as the 
appointment and terms of office of members of the Antimonopoly 
Committee. Chapter Seven: Legal Responsibilities provides penalties for 
violations of the Antimonopoly Law (including administrative sanctions 
and civil damages), legal remedies for parties to the antimonopoly cases, 
and the responsibilities of the staff members of antimonopoly authorities. 
Chapter Eight: Supplementary Provisions provides that the Antimonopoly 
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Law shall not apply, within five years after its promulgation, to behavior 
ratified by the competent antimonopoly authorities under the State Council 
in natural monopolies or public utilities like the postal service, railroads, 
electricity, gas, and water. 
The Antimonopoly Law is very specialized, involving both law and 
economics. It requires the government to establish a drafting body with 
high standards. Government officials drafted the current versions, and 
while they solicited the opinions of Chinese and foreign experts, they did 
not adopt all of the experts’ suggestions. The net result of this failure is 
that many serious problems still exist in the outline. For example, Article 3 
of the outline stipulates that “[b]usiness operators shall carry out 
production and business activities, and conduct fair competition in 
accordance with the principles of volunteerism, equality, fairness, honesty, 
and credibility.” At first glance, there is nothing wrong with the principles 
of “volunteerism,” “equality,” “fairness,” “honesty,” and credibility.” 
However, because the Antimonopoly Law opposes monopolies and 
protects competition by both prohibiting enterprises from restricting 
competition and controlling mergers between enterprises, principles such 
as the “freedom of contract” and “the autonomy of the will of parties” are 
not applicable. Another example is Article 8, Paragraph 4 of the outline, 
which provides that if one business operator occupies one half of the 
market, two business operators occupy more than two-thirds of the market, 
or three business operators occupy three-fourths of the market for a given 
commodity, such business operators occupy a market dominant position. 
However, Article 21 provides that if, in the course of a merger, an 
enterprise discovers that it will occupy one-third or more of the market 
after the merger, it must receive approval for the merger. This creates an 
apparent contradiction because an enterprise occupying one-third of the 
market is not in a market dominant position and therefore should not be 
required to report the merger to the appropriate antimonopoly authority for 
approval. 
2. Obstacles to the Adoption of the Antimonopoly Law in China 
The Antimonopoly Law drafting group, established in 1994, does not 
represent China’s first attempt to draft antimonopoly legislation. As early 
as 1987, the Bureau of Legislative Affairs of the State Council set up a 
drafting group to accomplish this task. In 1988, the group submitted the 
Draft Interim Regulations Against Monopoly and Unfair Competition. 
However, while the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People’s 
Congress adopted the Law Against Unfair Competition in September 
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1993, it did not adopt the Interim Regulations. The primary reason for the 
failure to adopt the Interim Regulations into law was the existence of 
differing opinions among the legislators and scholars as to whether China 
needed antimonopoly legislation at its current stage of economic 
development. One relatively popular opinion stated that China’s economy 
was still in the early stages of development, and therefore any 
monopolization was not yet apparent. The average size of the enterprises 
was still too small and horizontal alliances were just beginning to develop. 
Therefore, adopting antimonopoly legislation at this stage would have a 
negative effect on Chinese industrial policy. The 1987 evaluation report on 
China’s one hundred largest enterprises and nine largest industries, 
prepared by the China Enterprise Evaluation Center, represents this 
opinion. According to this report, the sales volumes of two-thirds of the 
one hundred largest industrial enterprises in China ranged between 500 
million and 1.5 billion yuan. According to the exchange rate at that time, 
this amounted to between only 134 million and 400 million U.S. dollars.79 
The sales volume of the largest industrial enterprise, the Daqing Oil 
Management Bureau, was only 6.3 billion yuan (US$1.7 billion).80 In 
comparison, the sales volume of General Motors, the largest industrial 
enterprise in the United States, was US$101.7 billion.81 Based on this 
information, the report concluded that because enterprises in China were 
relatively too small and economies of scales had not developed yet, it was 
not advisable to adopt antimonopoly legislation at that time.82 
This idea of the incompatibility between antimonopoly legislation and 
economies of scale already has lost its relevance. Most people realize that, 
although economies of scale are based on the scale of production, the scale 
of production is not necessarily directly proportional to the efficiency of 
the enterprises. When determining the actual scale of an enterprise in an 
industry, one should take into account not only the economies of scale but 
also internal conditions (including economic and technological conditions 
of the enterprise such as areas of specialized production and basic 
facilities) and external conditions (including the needs and maturity of the 
market). There is no absolute, universally applicable optimum enterprise 
scale in any industry. An enterprise must determine its scale of production 
 79. China Enterprise Evaluation Center, Zhongguo 1987 Nian Zuida Yibaijia Qiye he Jiuda 
Hangye [China’s 100 Biggest Enterprises and 9 Biggest Industries in 1987], 2 GUANLI SHIJIE 
[MANAGEMENT WORLD] 103 (1989).  
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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in light of its own production environment, technical conditions, 
management capabilities, market size, and consumer needs.  
The practice of determining the production scale of Chinese enterprises 
by comparing them with enterprises in the United States is ill advised. 
Such comparisons inhibit the establishment of both a socialist market 
economy with Chinese characteristics and a competitive market structure. 
For producers and business operators, an enterprise scale based solely on 
mechanical production is not always optimal because it does not consider 
market conditions, transportation conditions, and consumer demand for 
diversity.83 In 1997, Yaohan, the once powerful Japanese joint-stock 
company, went bankrupt. This incident proved that the survival and 
development of an enterprise depends on many factors, not merely on its 
scale of production. As a commentary in the Economic Daily pointed out, 
Yaohan should serve as a warning to those Chinese enterprises that scale 
expansion does not lead invariably to success.84 
The genuine difficulty that the antimonopoly legislation faces comes 
from China’s current economic system. Since China is still in a 
transitional period from a planned economy to a market economy, Chinese 
enterprises only recently have started to adopt market-oriented 
management systems. Many of these enterprises, especially large 
enterprises and enterprises in monopolized industries, are still government 
accessories. China still has a long way to go in separating government 
functions from business management. Therefore, the substantial Chinese 
antimonopoly legal norms may differ from those of countries with 
advanced market economics.  
State-owned enterprises face the biggest problems in China’s current 
economic reform. Specifically, they face inflexible management 
mechanisms, the inability to carry out technological innovation, debt, 
social burdens, a surplus of workers, difficulties in production and 
operation, declines in economic efficiency, and impoverished employees. 
Since antimonopoly legislation is the foundation that upholds the 
economic order of the markets, the reform and development of these state-
owned enterprises will have a major impact on any proposed 
antimonopoly legislation. In the current Chinese economy, all kinds of 
monopolies possess a certain administrative color, and the government, to 
 83. See Wang Xiaoye, Shehui Zhuyi Shichang Jingji Tiaojianxia de Fanlongduanfa 
[Antimonopoly Law in the Socialist Market Economy], ZHONGGUO SHEHUI KEXUE [SOC. SCI. IN 
CHINA], Feb. 1996, at 82-84. 
 84. Ka Lin, Cong Babaiban de Pochan Shuo Kai Qu [Reflections on the Bankruptcy of Yaohan], 
JINGJI RIBAO [ECONOMIC DAILY], Oct. 22, 1997. 
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a certain extent, supports enterprises’ acts that restrict competition. 
Therefore, regulating administrative monopolies is simultaneously the 
focal point and most difficult task in drafting antimonopoly legislation in 
China. As the experiences of countries with market economies 
demonstrate, the antimonopoly law enforcement authority must be a 
highly independent and authoritative organ. Under the current conditions 
in China, where enterprise management and government functions blend 
and the problems of departmental division and local protectionism are still 
very serious, it is questionable whether China can establish an independent 
and authoritative antimonopoly law enforcement organ. If the 
antimonopoly organ cannot handle cases or select and appoint its own staff 
members independently, the antimonopoly law will be worth less than the 
paper it is printed on. 
Nevertheless, the adoption and promulgation of an antimonopoly law is 
not premature at the current stage because various monopolistic acts and 
restrictions on competition exist. Without eliminating such acts, it will be 
impossible for China to establish an open and competitive market, fair and 
free competition, and a socialist market economic system. However, the 
adoption and promulgation of antimonopoly legislation is also necessary 
to deepen economic and political reform. 
Currently, the key to China’s economic reform is the reform of state-
owned enterprises, and promoting competition and breaking up 
monopolies are the keys to turning the state-owned enterprises into legal 
persons. Currently, China still lacks the mature market conditions 
necessary to implement antimonopoly legislation. However, China cannot 
wait for improved conditions because to do so would delay the 
establishment of the market economic system. China can promote the 
establishment of a market economic system by establishing a market-
oriented legal system. An effective antimonopoly law will play a 
fundamental role in the transformation of the economic system and the 
reform of state-owned enterprises in China. 
III. JOINING THE WTO: THE ADOPTION OF AN ANTIMONOPOLY LAW IN 
CHINA IS IMMINENT 
The aim of the WTO is to create a fair and reasonable environment for 
competition and promote the development of international trade through 
the adoption of a series of effective legal principles. To gain admission to 
the WTO, China had to establish and improve its legal systems in 
accordance with the basic principles of the WTO. For example, China had 
to revise its foreign trade law in accordance with international practices so 
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as to reduce import duties and gradually abolish import quotas and import 
license systems. China also revised its foreign investment law, which used 
to give foreign investors either super-national or sub-national treatment, 
thereby inhibiting fair market competition.  
On the other hand, joining the WTO means opening national markets to 
the outside world, thereby requiring further introduction of a competition 
mechanism into every industry and economic sector. Under these 
circumstances, China must improve its competition laws and promulgate 
an antimonopoly law as soon as possible. This will create a legal 
environment for free and fair competition. The Antimonopoly Law will 
play at least two roles in meeting the challenge of admission to the WTO. 
A. A New Antimonopoly Law Will Enhance the Market Competitiveness of 
Chinese Enterprises 
Chinese economists have put forward various policy proposals to 
enhance the market competitiveness of Chinese enterprises, including 
mergers, reorganizations, a stock holding system, conversion of debt into 
stock, concentration on large enterprises, and allowing different forms of 
ownership. In the long run, however, the state must introduce a 
competition mechanism into every area of the national economy as soon as 
possible in order to enhance the competitiveness of Chinese enterprises. 
According to basic principles of economics, it is only under the pressure of 
market competition that enterprises will attempt to reduce costs, improve 
the quality of products and services, continuously develop new technology 
and products, and improve operations management. Therefore, market 
competition is actually a process in which enterprises continuously temper 
themselves and adapt to the needs of the market. This enhances the 
economic effectiveness and market competitiveness of enterprises and 
optimizes the distribution of resources in society. Presently, breaking 
departmental monopolies is of special importance to the establishment of 
an open, competitive, and unified market structure in China because doing 
so represents the only effective way to implement competition 
mechanisms. Only in this way can enterprises eradicate various 
administrative interventions, improve their economic effectiveness 
through competition, expand their scale of production and operation, and 
realize economies of scale. 
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B. A New Antimonopoly Law Will Check the Monopoly Power of 
Transnational Corporations 
With the implementation of economic reform and open policy in 
China, transnational corporations have made large-scale investments in 
China, especially in the electronics and telecommunications equipment 
manufacturing industries. In 1995, foreign-invested enterprises occupied 
leading positions (in terms of gross value of industrial output) in four of 
the five major electronics industries in China. Specifically, the gross value 
of industrial output of foreign-invested enterprises consisted of 52.5% of 
the total gross value of industrial output in the telecommunications 
equipment manufacturing industry, 72.7% in the computer industry, 
52.7% in the electronic devices manufacturing industry, and 68.6% in the 
domestic electrical appliance manufacturing industry.85 
Foreign-invested enterprises dominate the markets of the majority of 
the second class industries in China as well. For example, foreign-invested 
enterprises own 91.3% of the gross value of industrial output in the 
integrated circuit manufacturing industry, 85.7% in the computer 
peripheral equipment manufacturing industry, 75.7% in the 
communication terminal equipment manufacturing industry, and 77.5% in 
the radio and tape recorder manufacturing industry.86 In brief, 
transnational corporations essentially have occupied the market dominant 
position in China’s electronic industry for quite some time.87 
China’s admission to the WTO and the further opening up of Chinese 
markets to the outside world means more and more transnational 
corporations will enter into the Chinese markets. These transnational 
corporations not only possess abundant financial resources, world famous 
trademarks, and strong sales networks and advertising, but they also can 
rely on support from their parent corporations in terms of capital and 
production technology. They can acquire market dominant positions 
quickly, including monopolies. In order to prevent both transnational 
corporations from monopolizing Chinese markets and enterprises from 
abusing market dominant positions, China urgently needs to adopt 
antimonopoly policies and laws. Since these policies and laws target 
enterprises with the most market power, the adoption of an antimonopoly 
 85. See Wang Yungui, Kuaguo Gongsi de Longduan Youshi Jiqi Dui Dongdaoguo de Chanye 
Kongzhi [The Monopoly Position of Transnational Companies and Their Control of the Industries in 
Host Countries], 2 GUANLI SHIJIE [MANAGEMENT WORLD] 216 (1998). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id.  
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law will serve as an important tool for China to check the influence of the 
transnational corporations. 
Of course, in any country, the adoption of an antimonopoly law is not 
solely for the purpose of checking the foreign monopoly power. It also 
uses competition mechanisms to both ensure the survival of the fittest 
enterprises and eliminate inferior enterprises so as to certify optimum 
resource distribution. Therefore, all competitors, domestic or foreign, 
state-owned or private, occupy equal positions under the rules of market 
competition. Otherwise, fair competition will not exist. However, 
compared with Chinese enterprises, transnational corporations possess an 
advantageous position in terms of capital and technology. They can 
occupy even market dominant positions. Under those circumstances, an 
antimonopoly law will, to a certain extent, protect weaker competitors.  
As China continues to open its markets and integrate into the global 
economy, the Antimonopoly Law will play a double role. On one hand, it 
will protect China’s domestic market competition and create a fair and free 
environment for competition so as to build China into a modern country 
with a socialist market economy. On the other hand, it will uphold the 
legitimate rights and interests of the enterprises in international 
competition and protect their opportunities to enter into the market, which 
undoubtedly will enhance China’s status in international economic and 
trade activities. 
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